Less Wrong and decision theory: sequence index

This is a sequence that introduces decision theory and attempts to explain why many people on the blogging site Less Wrong feel that a new form of decision theory is needed. This sequence is my attempt to capture the views of the most prominent Less Wrong members who deal with decision theory which carries with it two disclaimers:

1. It’s possible that I’ve misunderstood these views.
2. The views are not necessarily my own. That’s not to say that I’ve argued for anything I see as false in this sequence but rather to note that I don’t consider myself knowledgeable enough on this topic yet to have my own opinions. Instead, I can only summarise the views of others.

The following posts make up the sequence:

Post 1: An introduction to decision theory

Post 2: Newcomb’s Problem: A problem for causal decision theory (Also see: The errata to this post)

Post 3: The Smoking Lesion: A problem for evidential decision theory

Post 4: Decision Theories and strange scenarios

Post 5: An introduction to Timeless Decision Theory

These posts outline what I consider to be the standard arguments on Less Wrong for the failure of Causal Decision Theory and Evidential Decision Theory and looks at scenarios that many people on Less Wrong feel can be used to test new decision theories. It then introduces one of these new theories, Timeless Decision Theory.

Next Sequence: Pearl’s formalisation of causality which focuses on Judea Pearl’s book Causality: Models, Reasoning, and Inference